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PUBLIC SERVICE, PRIVATE ENTITY: SHOULD
THE NATURE OF THE SERVICE OR ENTITY BE
CONTROLLING ON ISSUES OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY?
LAUREN VILLAt

INTRODUCTION

Sovereign immunity is one of the basic tenets of American legal
theory.' Justification for the doctrine lies in the balancing of public needs:
governments provide vital services to citizens, and the public benefit of
having these services outweighs citizens' interests in unlimited
accountability arising from their delivery. When the cost of exposure to
unlimited liability outweighs the benefits of accountability, the
government's ability to continue public services is placed in jeopardy.
Sovereign immunity serves to protect the public by ensuring the continued
availability of essential public services.
Modem local governments are increasingly outsourcing to private
firms for public service provision.3 Privatization is used as a solution
where government programs are failing 4 because private firms offer
flexibility in program operation and management and are more adept at5
responding to changing circumstances than governmental entities.
Governments also benefit from private partnerships by way of the resulting
resources and personnel that become available for other uses. 6
Privatization and its resulting benefits can be encouraged by
extending sovereign immunity to private entities providing public services.
The principal justification for sovereign immunity applies equally to
t J.D. Candidate, June 2005, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2000, Binghamton
University.
1 See generally Peavler v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 528 N.E.2d 40, 41 (Ind. 1988) (describing the
doctrine's roots in the common law of the English monarchy and early acceptance in the United
States by the Supreme Court).
2 See infra Part II.B.
3 See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
4 See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
5 See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
6 See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
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private entities: the public's interest in the continued delivery of essential
services far outweighs their interest in redressibility. This Note proposes
that the controlling factor in the realm of sovereign immunity should be the
nature of the service provided. In privatization, modem governments are
finding new solutions to problems that have hindered effective public
service delivery. Immunity would encourage the beneficial trend towards
privatization.
This Note focuses specifically on emergency medical services to
illustrate these concepts. Because emergency medical service is a vital
part of any infrastructure, 7 the public interest served-the protection of
citizens' health and welfare-makes continued and improved delivery of
utmost importance. Part I discusses the doctrine of sovereign immunity
and the public policy behind it. Part II examines the various methods
private entities currently employ to gain immunity under individual state
statutes, and is divided into sub-parts based on the type of immunity statute
a particular state employs.
Finally, Part III explores the policy
justifications that favor extending sovereign immunity to private
emergency medical service providers, and proposes state legislative action
to implement private entity immunity where public services are involved.
I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND ITS POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS

A. Sovereign Immunity Generally

Sovereign immunity is:
A judicial doctrine which precludes bringing suit against the government
without its consent. Founded on the ancient principle that "the King can
do no wrong," it bars holding the government or its political subdivisions
liable for the torts of its officers or agents unless such immunity is
expressly waived by statute ..

8

Sovereign immunity "has deep-seated historical bases and is a well
established concept." 9 The doctrine is statutorily based in a majority of

7 See infra note 136.
8 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Md.

Port Admin. v. I.T.O Corp.

of Baltimore, 395 A.2d 145, 149 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978)).
9 COMM. ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN.,

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: THE LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT AND ITS OFFICIALS 5 (1976); see also

Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1890); Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386, 389
(1850) (pronouncing the doctrine as "universally assented to" and stating that "[n]o maxim is
thought to be better established"); United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436, 444 (1834);
Peavler v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 528 N.E.2d 40, 41 (Ind. 1988) ("Early in the country's history, the
U.S. Supreme Court noted that no suit may be commenced against the United States without its
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The distinction
states' ° and constitutionally based in the minority."
determines which branch of government retains control over immunity,
and thus governs its scope.' 2 Immunity may only be altered, limited,
or
3
abolished by the branch of government in control of such issues.'
Sovereign immunity applies to the state itself in addition to its
agencies, employees, and officers. 14 Courts examine several factors to
determine whether a specific entity or person is included within the reach
of sovereign immunity. 15 Governmental immunity is derived from
consent.") (citation omitted); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B, cmt. a (1979) ("The
sovereign immunity of the British crown... carried over to the several American state s ... ").
10 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT § 24-10-106 (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6109 (1997);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8103 (West 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1401 (2001); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 537.600 (West 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-A:1. (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
59:1-2 (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4 (Michie 2003); OH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 2744.02
(West 2002); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 § 2310 (West 1995); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 15-78-60 (Law. Coop. 2003); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (Vernon 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. §
63-30-3 (1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-39-104 (Michie 2003).
11 See, e.g., FL. CONST. art. X, § 13; KY. CONST. § 231; MT. CONST. art. II, § 18; W. VA.
CONST. art. VI, § 35.
12 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT § 1:5 (2003).
13 "Most states have also waived immunity in various degrees at both the state and local
government levels." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396; see also Ohio Valley Contractors v. Bd.
of Educ., 293 S.E.2d 437, 441 n.5 (W. Va. 1982) (listing cases which "reflect judicial opinions
significantly altering governmental immunities for local political subdivisions or entities")
(citations omitted). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B, cmt. b (noting
legislative "eliminati[on] or modiflication] [of] the general tort immunity" as a response to
judicial abolition of the doctrine); NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 9, at 99 ("In
almost all instances in which a state court has abolished immunity, the state legislature has either
completely reinstated it or limited the liability statutorily.").
14 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B(l) ("A State and its governmental
agencies are not subject to suit without the consent of the State."); see also Bd. of Educ. v.
Mayor of Riverdale, 578 A.2d 207, 210 (Md. 1990) ("The reason for this is that State agencies
exist merely as the State's 'hands or instruments to execute [the State's] will ....' (quoting City
of Baltimore v. State, 195 A.571 (Md. 1937))); Ohio Valley Contractors, 293 S.E.2d at 438
("[t]he state and its agencies performing state functions statewide are entitled to this absolute
immunity") (citations omitted).
15 See Rucker v. Harford County, 558 A.2d 399, 403-04 (Md. 1989) (noting that the
primary factor for determining whether an agency is one of the state is whether state has control
over the entity or person); Ohio Valley Contractors,293 S.E.2d at 438 ("Factors to consider are
whether the body functions statewide, whether it does the State's work, whether it was created by
an act of the Legislature, whether it is subject to local control, and its financial dependence of
State coffers.") (internal citations omitted); 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT § 1:13; see also Ky. Ctr. for the Arts v. Berns, 801 S.W.2d 327, 331 (Ky. 1991)
(employing "a two-pronged test, the first consisting of the 'direction and control of the central
State government,' and the second consisting of being 'supported by monies which are disbursed
by authority of the Commissioner of Finance out of the State treasury."') (quoting Gnau v.
Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 346 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961));
Kettner v. Wausau Ins. Co., 530 N.W.2d 399, 403 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that the
protections offered by the state sovereign immunity statute "apply to those agents who act under
a master-servant relationship with the government") (citations omitted).
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sovereign immunity and applies16to municipalities, political subdivisions,
counties, and agents of the state.
Some states apply the governmental/proprietary function distinction
in determining whether governmental immunity applies in a specific
instance.1 7 Immunity will only apply in jurisdictions following this rule
when the court determines a governmental function is at issue. Some
courts apply the discretionary/ministerial act distinction. 18 Further, many
jurisdictions abandoned these tests because "[t]he classification of
functions as governmental or proprietary was elusive and uncertain and
often led to inconsistent results."1 9

16 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT § 1:1 ("While the
governmental immunity of counties and municipal corporations is derived from the state's
immunity, it is narrower in scope than sovereign immunity."); see also Mayor of Riverdale, 578
A.2d at 210 ("While the governmental immunity of counties and municipalities is much narrower
than the immunity of the State, nevertheless the immunity of counties and municipalities is
derived from the State's sovereign immunity.") (citations omitted). Some states have extended
this type of immunity specifically by statute to emergency medical service providers. These
statutes will be discussed infra Part II.
17 See NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 9, at 4; CHARLES S. RHYNE ET AL.,
TORT LIABILITY AND IMMUNITY OF MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS 15-18 (1976). The distinction can be
described as follows:
The common-law governmental-proprietary distinction was derived from the dual
nature of municipal corporations. On one hand, a municipality is a corporate body,
capable of performing the same proprietary functions as any private corporation and
liable for its torts in the same manner and to the same extent as well. On the other
hand, a municipality is an arm of the state, and when acting in the governmental or
public capacity, it shares the sovereign immunity traditionally accorded to the state.
1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT § 2:1.
18 This distinction affords immunity only to those officials who exercise discretion in
carrying out their duties and denies immunity to officials carrying out routine or ministerial
tasks. See Kari v. City of Maplewood, 582 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn. 1998) ("A discretionary act
requires the exercise of individual judgment in carrying out the official's duties. In contrast, a
ministerial act is 'absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific duty
arising from fixed and designated facts."') (citations omitted); NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS
GEN., supra note 9, at 25; RHYNE ET AL., supra note 17, at 15-18.
19 Peavler v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 528 N.E.2d 40, 42 (Ind. 1988); see Austin v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 405 A.2d 255, 259-60 (Md. 1979) (upholding the test based on stare decisis, but
acknowledging its difficulties). "The majority today concedes that the line between governmental
and proprietary functions is often difficult to define and is sometimes illusory in practice." Id. at
273 (Cole, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); Ohio Valley Contractors,293 S.E.2d at 440 (noting
the "inherent uncertainty and incomprehensibility of predictable results attendant to
the.., distinction") (citations omitted); see also 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT § 2:1 ("The distinction between governmental and proprietary functions was often
unclear. As the Supreme Court observed, the distinction between a municipality's governmental
and proprietary functions is better characterized not as a line but as a succession of points.");
NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 9 at 25; RHYNE ET AL., supra note 17, at 15-19.
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B. Policy JustificationsSupporting Sovereign Immunity

Several policy considerations have traditionally been advanced in
support of sovereign immunity. 20 One of the most frequent rationales for
the doctrine is that it protects state resources from depletion due to the
need to satisfy judgments and defend against suits. 21 Another policy
justification is "the need for the orderly administration of the government,
which, in the absence of immunity, would be disrupted if the state could be
sued at the instance of every citizen., 22 A third justification is based on the
notion that "the general public.., would reap all the benefits from
vigorous and effective performance of duty by the public official. 23 The
concept underlying the third justification is that public officials faced with
the potential of liability stemming from the performance of their duties
might refrain from acting, thus compromising the effective delivery of
public services.24
20 The contention that the policy goals served by sovereign immunity generally support the
extension of immunity to private entities providing emergency medical service is discussed infra
Part III.
21 See Berek v. Metro. Dade County, 396 So. 2d 756, 758 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(offering "the protection of the public against profligate encroachments on the public treasury" as
a justification for sovereign immunity); Peavler,528 N.E.2d at 41(advancing as a justification "a
reluctance to divert public funds to compensate for private injuries"); Brown v. Wichita State
Univ., 547 P.2d 1015, 1027 (Kan. 1976) (stating that sovereign immunity is supported by "the
necessity to protect the state treasury"); Messina v. Burden, 321 S.E.2d 657, 660 (Va. 1984)
("[Tihe doctrine of sovereign immunity serves a multitude of purposes including but not limited
to protecting the public purse ..... ); Kettner v. Wasau Ins. Co., 530 N.W.2d 399, 403 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1995) (stating that "[t]he purpose of [the sovereign immunity] statute is to protect the
government and taxpayers from excessive claims by limiting the governmenl's exposure to
potential liability"); see also NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 9, at 6 (noting that a
typical policy justification for governmental immunity is the "need to prevent the diversion of
public funds to compensate for private purposes").
22 Berek, 396 So. 2d at 758 (citation omitted); see Brown, 547 P.2d at 1027 (noting that the
burden of defending suits would "inhibit the administration of traditional state activities"); Bd. of
Educ. v. Mayor of Riverdale, 578 A.2d 207, 211 (Md. 1990) (noting that governmental immunity
"prevents any burdensome interference with the State's governmental functions"); Messina, 321
S.E.2d at 660 ("[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity... provid[es] for smooth operation of
government"); see also NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supranote 9, at 6.
23 RHYNE ET AL., supra note 17, at 12.

See Kari v. City of Maplewood, 582 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn. 1998) (holding that
paramedics were entitled to official immunity because the absence of immunity might produce "a
chilling effect on the discretion to be exercised" by such persons); Messina, 321 S.E.2d at 660
(advancing that sovereign immunity "eliminat[es] public inconvenience and danger that might
spring from officials being fearful to act"); RHYNE ET AL., supra note 17, at 8; see also Peavler,
528 N.E.2d at 44 ("Governmental immunity... avoids inhibiting the effective and efficient
performance of governmental duties."); Brown, 547 P.2d at 1028 (noting that the imposition of
liability on governmental agencies that routinely provide services that most private companies
decline to offer due to the high risk involved "might become extremely burdensome to the
taxpayers").
24
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II. SURVEY OF STATE STATUTES UNDER WHICH PRIVATE EMERGENCY
MEDICAL SERVICE PROVIDERS MAY CURRENTLY ENJOY IMMUNITY

The analysis below illustrates the types of immunity statutes that may
benefit private emergency medical service providers. In most states,
private entities will not benefit from express statutes, but may be able to
gain immunity under either general sovereign or express emergency
medical service immunity provisions.2 5 Statutes authorizing governmental
entities to contract with private entities for the provision of emergency
medical services often provide the conduit through which general
sovereign or governmental immunity statutes become applicable to private
corporations.26
The definitions provided in various immunity statutes play an
important role in this analysis and are examined closely. The states
discussed below are organized into five categories: (1) those with statutes
under which individual emergency medical technicians may be offered
immunity; (2) those with statutes under which private entities may be
offered immunity; (3) those with statutes under which both individual
technicians and the private entities employing them may be entitled to
immunity; (4) those that have not addressed the issue squarely, but where
statutes and case law provide nominal support for private entity immunity;
and (5) those with potentially applicable notice and/or damage-cap
provisions.
A. States With Statutes Immunizing Individual Technicians
In Massachusetts, emergency medical technicians enjoy personal
immunity for liability arising from the good faith performance of job
duties.27 This provision applies to rendering emergency medical services,
as well as transportation to a hospital or other safe place. 28 Additionally,
individual technicians are not liable to a hospital to which they deliver a
patient if the patient is admitted. 29 This statute is to be applied narrowly
and is unlikely to provide any further protections than those enumerated
therein.30

25

Carrie Ovey Wiggins, Note, Ambulance Malpracticeand Immunity: Can a PlaintiffEver

Prevail?,24 J. LEGAL MED. 359, 367 (2003).
26 See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
27 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 11 C § 21 (Law. Co-op. 2004).
28 Id.
29

id.

30 See Musto v. Cataldo Ambulance Serv., Civ. A. No. 93-7071-E, 1995 WL 389944, at *2

(Super. Ct. Mass. Feb. 28, 1995) (denying liability of a technician who provided services "during
a non-emergency routine transfer").
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Mississippi immunizes certified technicians from liability arising
from the provision of emergency medical care to a person in need. 31 The
statute requires that the care be rendered "in good faith and in the exercise
of reasonable care" and applies to care given at the scene of an emergency
or while in transit to a medical facility. 32 The statute also applies to
omissions made in good faith while using reasonable care.33 While this
statute would presumably provide protection to private emergency medical
personnel, there is no indication that its protections would extend to the
employer of an emergency medical technician or paramedic. 34
Montana offers limited immunity to emergency medical technicians
for "failure to obtain consent in performing acts... where the patient is
unable to give consent and there is no other person present legally
acts are in good faith and without
authorized to consent, provided that such
35
knowledge of facts negating consent.,
Individual emergency medical technicians and paramedics in Ohio are
immunized from losses arising from the provision of medical care, absent
willful or wanton misconduct.3 6 The officers and employees of private
entities that have contracted with a political subdivision are immune from
liability arising from the negligence of an emergency medical technician or
paramedic, absent willful or wanton misconduct.37 There is no indication
that this immunity extends to private entities themselves.38
While the immunity in the above states is statutorily granted to
individual emergency medical technicians, a private entity employing
technicians may successfully argue that no vicarious liability can attach
where the employee is individually immune. 39 In Louisiana, this defense
was held to be available to private ambulance companies when the liability

31 MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-25-37 (Supp. 2003).

32 id.
33

Id. § 73-25-37(2)(c).

34 See Willard v. Mayor of Vicksburg, 571 So. 2d. 972, 975 (Miss. 1990). The court denied

summary judgment to the ambulance operator, but refused to interpret § 73-25-37, deciding the
case on other grounds. Id. The court "invite[d] the legislature to review and amend [the
provision] to include a pre-existing duty exception. Those who have a pre-existing duty to render
aid should not be allowed to hide behind the cloak of the Good Samaritan Statute." Id.
35 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-6-206 (2003).
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4765.49(A) (Anderson 2003).
37 Id. § 4765.49(B).
38 But see infra Part II.B for discussion of another Ohio statute. One scholar has studied the
36

two sources of immunity potentially available to emergency medical service and technicians in
Ohio and has concluded that because each provision enumerates a different standard of care,
conflict is bound to arise in a litigation context. Wiggins, supra note 25, at 369-70.
'9 Wiggins, supra note 25, at 369.
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of the private ambulance service is vicarious, stemming solely from the
liability of its personnel.4 °
Louisiana statutorily affords immunity to certified emergency medical
personnel from liability arising from the rendering of emergency medical
care to an individual "while in the performance of... medical duties and
following the instructions of a physician.",4' This immunity also extends to
"public agencies engaged in rendering emergency medical services.2
Pursuant to the Political Subdivisions Tort Claim Act,43 Nebraska
adopts governmental immunity with certain statutory exceptions." The
state also grants exemption from tort liability to "out-of-hospital
emergency care provider[s]" for emergency medical services rendered in
good faith. 45 The immunity does not apply if the liability arises in
connection with the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence
of drugs or alcohol.46 The statute is further restricted when the liability
results from gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct. 7 Recent
decisions by the Nebraska Supreme Court have followed the Kyser court's
reasoning and declined to impute liability to the employer where the
individual employee was immune by statute.48
B. States With Statutes Immunizing Entities Only
Governmental entities in the state of Maine are generally immune
from liability pursuant to statutory provision. 49 Governmental entities50
Kyser v. Metro Ambulance Inc., 764 So. 2d 215, 219 (La. Ct. App. 2000). See also
Wiggins, supra note 25, at 369 (discussing Kyser and noting that "[i]f other states applied this
court's reasoning, then all ambulance services in states with codified immunity statutes would be
eligible, irrespective of whether they were governmentally or privately owned").
41 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1233(A)(1) (West 2001).
42 Id. § 40:1233(A)(2).
43 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 13-901-13-926 (1997).
44 Id. § 13-902.
41 Id. § 71-5194(1).
46 Id.
40

47 Id.
48 See

Hatcher v. Bellevue Volunteer Fire Dep't., 628 N.W.2d 685, 695 (Neb. 2001)
(rejecting the claim that a volunteer fire department which provided emergency medical services
remained liable even though the individual firefighters were immune under a specific statutory
provision); Drake v. Drake, 618 N.W.2d 650, 661-62 (Neb. 2000) (reaffirming "that the
immunity conferred upon ambulance attendants by [§ 71-5194] also immunizes the city or other
entity with whom those individuals might be in an agency relationship" and declining to impute
vicarious liability on a fire company based on the negligence of an employee); see also Wicker v.
City of Ord, 447 N.W.2d 628, 633 (Neb. 1989) (stating that "when a public employee has been
found to be immune from liability, this court has generally held that such immunity extends to
the political subdivision").
49 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 8103(i) (West 2003).
'o Id. § 8104-B(3).
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and their employees51 are immune from liability stemming from the
exercise of discretionary functions. 52 A "governmental entity" includes the
state and its political subdivisions5 3 and any emergency medical service
acting within its scope of authority.54 Thus, if a private provider fits the
statutory definition and can show that it was exercising a discretionary
function, it will enjoy immunity.55
Ohio employs the governmental act distinction in affording immunity
to political subdivisions and their employees. 6
A "governmental
function" is defined to include "police, fire, emergency medical,
ambulance, and rescue services or protection., 57 "Political subdivision" is
defined to include entities "responsible for governmental activities in a
geographic area smaller than that of the state., 58 Another provision
authorizes governmental entities to contract with private fire or emergency
medical service companies for the provision of services. 59 Emergency
medical service is deemed a governmental function by statute, and political
subdivisions entitled to immunity include entities responsible for such
functions. 60 Therefore, a private entity providing emergency medical
service should be entitled to immunity under these provisions.

"1 Id. § 8111l(1)(c).
52 Roberts v. Maine, 731 A.2d 855, 857 (Me. 1999). The Maine courts use a four-factor test
to determine if a function is discretionary. To pass the test, the challenged conduct must be
"essential to the realization or accomplishment" of a "basic governmental policy, program or
objective." Id. Under this reasoning, a successful argument could be mounted in favor of
extending immunity to private emergency medical service providers because such services are
essential to the accomplishment of a basic governmental policy, namely, citizen health
protection.
53 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 8102(2), amended by Act of June 23, 3003, 2003 Me.
Laws 489.
54 Id. tit. 14 § 8102(1-A). "Emergency medical service" is defined by the statute as "a
nonprofit, incorporated ambulance service.. . receiving full or partial financial support form or
officially recognized by the State, a municipality or county... except when the emergency
medical service is acting outside the scope of activities expressly authorized by the State,
municipality, [or] county." Id.
55 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
56 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.02(A)(1) (Anderson 2003) (providing that
political
subdivisions are immune from liability arising from the performance of a governmental function
by the subdivision or an employee); see also supra notes 17, 18 and accompanying text
(indicating that proprietary functions form an exception to immunity).
57 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.01(C)(2)(a).
58 Id. § 2744.01(F).
59 Id. § 9.60(C).
60 See Wiggins, supra note 25, at 370.
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C. States With Statutes Immunizing PrivateEntities and Their Employees
In Arizona, private ambulance companies whose services are
procured by a city, town or proprietor are not liable in tort absent a finding
of gross negligence or intentional misconduct. 6 1 The immunity extends to
individual emergency medical technicians, but not while operating a motor
vehicle. 62
An Illinois statute provides immunity from liability for those who, in
the course of employment duties, provide medical services of an
emergency or non-emergency nature in good faith and absent willful and
wanton misconduct.63 The same provision protects persons, "including
any private or governmental organization or institution that administers,
sponsors, authorizes, supports, finances, educates or supervises the
functions of emergency medical services personnel" from liability "for any
act or omission in connection with administration, sponsorship,
authorization, support, finance, education or supervision of such
emergency medical services personnel, where the act or omission occurs in
connection with activities within the scope of this [provision]. '6
Consequently, private entities and their employees are immune under the
statute for liability arising from the provision of emergency medical care.65
Michigan offers immunity to, among other medical personnel,
emergency medical technicians providing care outside of a hospital, for
acts or omissions not amounting to gross negligence or willful
misconduct.6 6
The immunity specifically extends to "life support
agenc[ies]" and their employees.6 7 A life support agency is defined as "an
ambulance operation.., or medical first response service., 68 Thus, private
61 ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.02(A) (West 1996).
62 id.
63

210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/3.150(a) (West 2000).

64id
65

See Collins v. Superior Air-Ground Ambulance Serv., Inc., No. 1-01-4386, 2003 111.App.

LEXIS 526 (Ill. App. Ct. April 29, 2003). In Collins, the court did not address the merits of
defendant ambulance service's affirmative defense of immunity under § 50/3.150(a), but did set
out four factual questions that would have to be resolved for the statute to apply. First, the court
stated that defendant had the burden of proving it acted in good faith. Second, whether defendant
was "an authorized agency entitled to immunity under the EMS Act" needed to be determined.
Id. at *44. Third, the defendant had to show it did in fact render medical services, and fourth,
plaintiff was "entitled to... the opportunity to discover facts which could establish whether
[defendant's] acts in transporting [plaintiff] were wilful [sic] and wanton." Id.; see also
Washington v. City of Evanston, 782 N.E.2d 847, 856 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that §
50/3.150(b) granted immunity to defendant hospital as "coordinat[or], monitor[] and supervis[or]
[of] the regional EMS system").
66 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.20965(1) (2004).
67 Id. § 333.20965(1)(d).
68 Id § 333.20906(1).
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entities and their employees are statutorily immunized from liability
resulting from patient care rendered outside of a hospital.
A Rhode Island statute provides immunity to licensed emergency
medical service providers for liability arising "in connection with services
rendered outside a hospital," provided that the care was within the scope of
the person's training, absent gross negligence or willful and wanton
misconduct. 69 The same statute provides similar immunity to an "agency,
organization, institution, [or] corporation... that sponsors, authorizes,
supports, finances, or supervises the functions of emergency medical
services personnel." 70 A "principal, agent, contractor, employee, or
representative" of one of the above enumerated entities is also afforded
immunity pursuant to this provision. 71 Thus, by its terms, this provision
provides immunity to private entities and their employees. Private
ambulance services that are solely used to transport patients in nonemergency situations are exempted, however.72
Where a private
ambulance service is engaged in transporting patients in both emergency
and non-emergency situations, one court has held that "a functional
approach" is to be used in determining whether immunity applies.73
D. States Where PrivateEntity Immunity for Emergency Medical Service
ProvidersRemains an Open Issue
By statute, New Mexico grants immunity from tort liability to a
"governmental entity" and "any public employee" for virtually all torts. 74
Pursuant to the statute a governmental entity must provide a defense for
and pay any judgment entered against a public employee for a tort
committed within the scope of the employment.75 A "governmental entity"
is defined as "the state or any local public body., 76 A "local public body"
means "all political subdivisions of the state and their agencies,
instrumentalities and institutions., 77 "State" or "state agency" means the

69 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.1-12(a) (2001).
70 Id. § 23-4.1-12(b).
71 Id. § 23-4.1-12(c).
72 Id. § 23-4.1-13.
73 Lavallee v. Alert Ambulance Servs., 854 F. Supp. 60, 62 (D.R.I. 1994) (noting that the
functional approach looks to the type of transportation the ambulance service was engaged in at
the time of the incident at issue).
74 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(A) (Michie 2003).
71 Id. §§ 41-4-4(B)(1), 41-4-4(D)(1). The statute relieves the governmental entity of the
duty to defend if an insurance company provides a defense. Id. § 41-4-4(B).
76 Id. § 41-4-3, amended by An Act of April 8, 2003, 2003 N.M. Laws 399 § 3(B).
77 Id. § 41-4-3(C).
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State of New Mexico or any of its branches, agencies, departments, boards,
instrumentalities, or institutions.78
Whether or not immunity will apply to a private emergency services
provider is a fact specific issue, with the dispositive inquiry being whether
the private entity can fit within any of the above definitions. The Supreme
Court of New Mexico has recognized that sovereign immunity applies to
independent contractors acting on behalf of the state for tortious acts
committed within the scope of their duties,79 providing precedent for a
successful argument on behalf of a private corporation with a state contract
to provide emergency medical service.
In South Carolina, governmental entities are immune from suit based
on discretionary acts of the entity, employee, or the "performance or
failure to perform any act or service which is in the discretion or judgment
of the governmental entity or employee." 80 Governmental entities are
defined as the "[s]tate and its political subdivisions.", 81 The definition of
employee includes "any. . . agent of the State or its political
subdivisions.., and persons acting on behalf or in service of a
governmental entity in the scope of official duty., 82 Thus, for a private
emergency service provider to receive immunity under these provisions it
must be deemed to be carrying out an official duty on behalf of a
governmental entity. A classification of independent contractor will
preclude immunity.83
Tennessee waives sovereign immunity for governmental entities for
losses arising from an employee's negligence with listed exceptions,
including discretionary functions. 84 "Governmental entity" is defined as
"any political subdivision of the state of Tennessee including, but not
limited to, any municipality, metropolitan government, county" and
others.85 The only way that private emergency medical service providers

71 Id.§ 41-4-3(H).
79 See Saiz v. Belen Sch. Dist., 827 P.2d 102, 117 n.14 (N.M. 1992) ("[B]y specifically

excluding independent contractors from the definition of 'public employee' ... we can infer that
the legislature retained immunity for the tortious acts of independent contractors committed
within the scope of their duties.").
80 S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2003).
" Id. § 15-78-30(d). The term "political subdivision" is defined to include counties and
municipalities. Id. § 15-78-30(h). The term "state" includes the state itself and "any of its offices,

agencies, authorities, departments, commissions, boards, divisions [and] instrumentalities." Id.§
15-78-30(e).
82 Id. § 15-78-30(c).
3 Id.§ 15-78-30(i).
84

TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205 (Supp. 2003). Thus, immunity is retained where a

discretionary function gives rise to liability.
" Id.§ 29-20-102(3)(A).
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can benefit from this immunity is if they qualify as a political subdivision
of the state by virtue of a contract with such an entity. This argument is
supported by the holding of the Supreme Court of Tennessee:
"[A]mbulance service is a necessary function of city government, imposed
by the government's basic mandate to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens. 8 6 Thus, if a city chooses to privatize ambulance
service for its residents, the ambulance service may be deemed an
instrument of a governmental entity entitled to immunity.
Texas provides sovereign immunity to governmental units for torts
87
committed by its employees unless three conditions are found to exist.
"Governmental units" are not defined in the statute. 88 Texas courts have
interpreted the statute as providing immunity to governmental employees
for discretionary acts. 89 To qualify for immunity, medical personnel must
be exercising governmental-not medical--discretion. 90
Private
emergency medical service providers may qualify as governmental
employees or units if they have a contract with a local government to
provide emergency services and are 91exercising medical discretion,
otherwise they will not receive immunity.
In Virginia, for a private entity to receive immunity, it must first
qualify as a state employee.
Once the entity is qualified, the
Commonwealth assumes liability up to $100,000, or the maximum limits
of liability of any insurance policy in place at time of loss, whichever is
86

City of Memphis v. Bettis, 512 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tenn. 1974) (recognizing as part of the

court's longstanding jurisprudence that "the mere collection of fees from a given service does not
per se transform an otherwise public function into a private one").
87 TEx. Civ. PRAC & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (Vernon 1997). The conditions
are: (1)
the injury or property damage arises out of the "operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or
motor driven equipment; and (2) the employee would be personally liable to the claimant
according to Texas law; and (3) personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of
tangible personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be
liable to the claimant according to Texas law." Id.
88 See id
89 See City of El Paso v. Higginbotham, 993 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Tex. App. 1999); see also
Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex. 1997); City of Lancaster v. Chambers,
883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994).
90 Kassen v. Hatley, 887 S.W.2d 4, 10-12 (Tex. 1994). To determine whether governmental
discretion was in fact exercised, "[tihe focus must remain upon the facts of the individual case
and the underlying policies promoted by official immunity." Id. at 12. The court also listed
several factors which courts should consider and recognized that "[s]uch decisions necessarily
involve a balancing of individual rights and the public interest." Id.
91 See Carrola v. Guillen, 935 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. App. 1996) (stating that "emergency
medical service is particularly deserving of immunity"); see also Ayala v. City of Corpus Christi,
507 S.W.2d 324, 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) ("[Emergency medical service is] a service kindred
to the police or fire service. This type of service is incident to the police power of the state: i.e. to
protect the health, safety, and general welfare of its citizens.").
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greater.92 "Employee" is defined to include "any officer, employee or
agent of any agency, or any person acting on behalf of an agency in an
official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the
Commonwealth. 9 3 Thus, a private entity which contracts with an entity
included in the definition of "agency ' '94 for the provision of emergency
qualify as a state employee if acting "in an official
services may
95
capacity."

The Fourth Circuit held that volunteer fire departments, rescue
squads, and their employees are protected from liability by sovereign
immunity.96 Local governments are authorized to contract with volunteer
fire fighting and emergency medical service companies and such
companies are statutorily deemed "instrumentalities of the state" entitled to
sovereign immunity.97 Whether this statute applies to private concerns is
an open issue.
In Wyoming, governmental entities and employees acting within the
scope of their employment are immunized from tort liability.98 The term
"governmental entity" is defined to include "state... or any local
government." 99 "Local government" is defined as "cities and towns,
counties... all political subdivisions of the state, and their agencies,
instrumentalities and institutions." 100 There are two methods by which a
private emergency medical service provider may receive immunity. A
provider may qualify as an "agenc[y], instrumentalit[y], [or]
institution[]"' 01 of a political subdivision, and therefore fit within the
definition of "governmental entity." Alternatively, if a private entity can
qualify as an employee of a governmental entity, a different statute
provides that the State assumes liability for damages arising from the
02
negligence of a health care provider employed by a governmental entity.
92 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (Michie 1998).

9' Id. § 8.01-195.2.
94 Agency is defined as "any department, institution, authority, instrumentality, board or
other administrative agency of the government of the Commonwealth of Virginia." Id.
95 See Edwards v. City of Portsmouth, 375 S.E.2d 747, 749-50 (Va. 1989) (holding that the
provision of ambulance services by a city is a governmental function); see also VA. CODE ANN.
§ 32.1-156(B) (authorizing counties to enter into contracts for the provision of emergency
medical services).
96 Overman v. Occoquan, Woodbridge, Lorton Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc., No. 90-2475,
1991 WL 255849, at *3, 4 (4th Cir. Dec. 6, 1991) (per curiam).
97 VA. CODE ANN.

§ 27-23.6(A).

98 WYO.STAT. ANN. § 1-39-104 (Michie 1999).
99 Id. § 1-39-103(a)(i).
'0oId.
§ 1-39-103(a)(ii).
101 Id.
102 Id. § 1-39-110(a). But see id. § 1-39-103 (a)(iv)(B) (providing that independent
contractors are not included within the meaning of "public employee").
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E. States With Notice and/orDamage Cap ProvisionsPotentially
Applicable to PrivateEmergency Medical Service Providers
Florida waives sovereign immunity by statute for the state and its
agencies and subdivisions.10 3
By definition, these agencies and
subdivisions include corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or
agencies of the state, counties, or municipalities.10 4 The state, agencies,
and subdivisions are not liable for punitive damages, pre-judgment
interest, or in excess of $100,000 per plaintiff, and not in excess of
$200,000 per occurrence without legislative action.'0 5 Notice must also be
presented to the appropriate agency and the state insurance department
within three years after the accident.10 6 Employees of the agency or
subdivision are immune from suit
and a claimant's exclusive remedy is
07
entity.'
governmental
the
against
Minnesota waives sovereign immunity for loss of property or
personal injury or death caused by the act or omission of an employee of
the state while acting within the scope of his employment to the extent a
private person would be liable.'0 8 Certain exceptions to liability are
enumerated, including discretionary functions of employees. 0 9 Pursuant
to the waiver of immunity, the statute limits the amount of damages
recoverable."10
Municipalities within the state also waive immunity"' subject to
similar damage limits. 12 A municipality is defined to include, among
other entities, any "city... county, town, public authority, [or] public
corporation. ' 1 3 The definition of employee includes people "acting on
behalf of the municipality in an official capacity." ' 1 4 A private emergency
medical service provider that contracts with a municipality may qualify as

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(1) (West 1997).
Id. § 768.28(2).
105 Id. § 768.28(5); see N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Eldred, 466 So. 2d 1210, 1211 (Fla. Dist.

103
'04

Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the statutory damage limits apply to "corporations primarily acting
as instrumentalities or agencies of the state").
106

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(6)(a).

107 Id. § 768.28(9)(a). There is no immunity for employees acting in "bad faith or with

malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights,
safety, or property." Id.
108MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.736(1) (West 1997).
109 Id. § 3.736(3)(b).
110 Id. § 3.736(4). The limits range from $300,000 to $1,000,000. Id.
I. Id. § 466.02 (West 2001).
112 Id. § 466.04. A different provision enumerates exceptions to the waiver of immunity. Id.
113
114

Id. § 466.01(1).
Id. § 466.01(6).
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"acting on behalf of the municipality in an official capacity" and thus
acquire immunity. 115
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has recognized that "[d]enying
[defendant paramedic] official immunity would have a chilling effect on
the discretion to be exercised by emergency vehicle drivers enroute to
medical emergencies, and would conflict with our well-established law
respecting the independent judgment that must be exercised by public
servants in emergency situations." ' 1 6 It seems the court may be willing to
expand this rationale to apply to technicians rendering medical care in an
emergency situation.
Vermont waives sovereign immunity for losses caused by its
employees acting within the scope of employment if a private person
would be liable under the same circumstances, with damages capped at
$1,000,000 by statute and exceptions listed, including discretionary
functions. 1 7 The section identifying positions that qualify as "state
employees" is, by its terms, to be construed expansively." 18 If a private
entity can qualify as a state employee not exercising a discretionary
function it may benefit from immunity because a plaintiffs "exclusive
right of action" is against the state. 1 9
In West Virginia, "[e]very person, corporation, ambulance service,
emergency medical service provider, emergency ambulance authority,
emergency ambulance service or other person which employs emergency
medical service personnel.., or provides ambulance service in any
manner" must obtain liability insurance with a minimum limit of
$1,000,000 per occurrence. 12
The statute further provides that such
organizations and their employees cannot be liable for amounts in excess
of the policy limits unless the loss was caused by intentional or malicious
conduct. 121 Private entities 22are covered under the definition of "emergency
1
medical service provider."'
115 Id. While the text of the statute excludes independent contractors except for nonprofit

firefighting corporations, it is unclear whether private emergency medical services would fall
under the exception to the definition of "employee." Id.
116 Kari v. City of Maplewood, 582 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn. 1998) (holding city paramedic
immune from liability resulting from a collision with the plaintiff while responding to an
emergency).
117 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5601 (2003).
118Id. tit. 3, § 1101.
119 Id. tit. 12, § 5602(a).
0 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-4C-16(1) (Michie 2001).
121Id. § 16-4C-16(2).
122Id. § 16-4C-3(h). The definition includes "any... corporation... public or private,
which owns or operates a licensed emergency medical services agency providing emergency

medical service in [West Virginia]." Id.
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Suits against the state of Wisconsin are permitted pursuant to a notice
provision and liability limits.123 The maximum amount recoverable against
a governmental entity is $50,000; the personal liability of governmental
employees is capped at $250,000.124
In Wisconsin, liability is the general rule, and immunity is the
exception.1 25 One of the exceptions to liability is for agencies of
governmental subdivisions and political corporations for the discretionary
acts of their employees. 126 While the statute does not define agency, the
Court of Appeals has construed it to include parties involved in a masterservant relationship with the government, and to exclude independent
contractors. 127 The court stated that the existence of a master-servant
relationship is a question of fact that hinges upon how much control the
governmental entity has over the agent. 128 Thus, private emergency
medical service providers may qualify as agents of the state and be entitled
to immunity for the negligence of their employees, but such a
determination is an issue of fact.
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORTING THE EXTENSION OF IMMUNITY
TO PRIVATE PROVIDERS OF PUBLIC SERVICES

Increasingly, local governments are partnering with the private sector
for the provision of public services. 29 Decisions regarding privatization
(West 2002).
124Id. §§ 893.80(3), 893.82(6).
125Linville v. City of Janesville, 497 N.W.2d 465, 470 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
126WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.80(4).
127 Kettner v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 530 N.W.2d 399, 401, 404 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
12 Id. at 404.
129 See Janna J. Hansen, Limits of Competition: Accountability in Government Contracting,
123 WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 893.80(l)(a), 893.80(3), 893.82

112 YALE L.J. 2465, 2465 (2003) ("Government contracts with private providers for the supply
of goods and services have grown in number and magnitude over the last several decades."); E.S.
Savas, Competition and Choice in New York City Social Services, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 82, 82

(2002) (noting that "[b]y 1992, the fraction of U.S. local governments that relied entirely on their
own in-house units for various programs was small"). According to one study, by 1992, only 6%
of local governments directly provided day care facilities, 7% directly provided substance abuse
treatment facilities and no local government surveyed operated homeless shelters.
Correspondingly, 54, 25 and 5% of the same localities contracted with for-profit firms for day
care facilities, substance abuse treatment facilities and homeless shelter operation, respectively.
Id. at 182-83. "Increasingly, for-profit firms are entering the social service field, providing
services

directly ....

Examples ... are

determining

eligibility for benefits,

administering

Welfare-to-Work programs, handling child welfare functions ranging from foster care to
adoption to family services, and tracking down 'deadbeat dads' to collect support payments." Id.
at 90; see also David M. Van Slyke, The Mythology of Privatization in Contractingfor Social

Services, 63 PUB. ADMIN. REV 296, 296 ("Contracting is the most widely used form of social
services privatization and has been on the rise for more than four decades."). Privatization has
been endorsed by both Congress and the President. See George Cahlink, Jails Inc., 34 GOv'T.
EXECUTIVE 42, 43 (2002) ("Congress has encouraged prison privatization efforts.");
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are motivated by a variety of factors. Privatization is often viewed as a
solution where government-operated programs fail to effectively provide
public services. 130 The private sector is adept at responding to changing
circumstances by implementing innovative methods of program operation,
ultimately benefiting the public.131
Privately operated public service programs are widely regarded as
more efficient and cost-effective than those managed by local
governments. 132 Competition is the vehicle through which these results are
achieved. 133 Outsourcing to private firms may also benefit citizens by

Privatization: Worth a Try if ContractsAre Kept Above the Table, HOUS. CHRON., June 7, 2003,
at 38 (noting "[t]he Bush administration's push for greater privatization of work done by federal
civilian employees"). Of the 1.8 million federal jobs staffed by federal employees, up to 850,000
of those jobs would be taken over by private employees under the White House Office of
Management and Budget's amended rules. Id.
130See Cahlink, supra note 129, at 42-43 (discussing the federal government's privatization
program for federal prisons). "Like state and county governments that embraced prison
privatization in the 1980's and 1990's, the Bureau of Prisons has found that tougher laws and a
scarcity of funds have made it all but impossible to adequately house federal inmates without
outside help." Id. at 42; see also Hansen, supra note 129, at 2465 (noting that "[l]awsuits
challenging the quality of government services can motivate quick change"); Ron Martz, Fulton
Officials Favor Privatization for Embattled Children's Shelter, ATLANTA J. CONST., May 30,
2001, at lB ("One week after Georgia's child advocate issued a stinging report on the state's
largest emergency shelter for abused and neglected children, Fulton County child welfare
officials say they want a private firm to run it."); Misty Reagin, Indianapolis Outsources O&M
for Waterworks, 117 AM. CITY & COUNTY 16 (2002) (City officials describing Indianapolis's
privatization decision with respect to city waterworks "' felt it would be best to leave the day-today opIerations to the experts').
131 Private prisons are able to tailor programs to meet the specific needs of immigrant
felons. See Cahlink, supra note 129, at 43. In California City, the private contractor in control of
the federal prison instituted a program enabling Mexican prisoners to earn the equivalent of a
Mexican high school diploma. Id. The official in charge of privatization of federal prisons
observed that the above program would be cost-prohibitive in a governmentally controlled
prison. Id. In the social service arena, one study has shown that "[b]etween 1971 and 1979, the
fraction of state and local services provided [privately] increased from 25 percent to 55 percent
because local governments could not mobilize internally fast enough to take advantage of the
federal funding available for new social programs." Savas, supra note 130, at 82 (internal
citation omitted).
132 See Slyke, supra note 130, at 297 ("The arguments for privatization have emphasized a
combination of reduced costs, improved service, increased management flexibility, specialized
expertise, and decreased public monopoly inefficiencies.").
133 See Hansen, supra note 129, at 2466 (stating that policymakers "believe that the market
for contracts will promote efficiency"); Savas, supra, note 129, at 82 (observing that competition
and choice--critical ingredients for good performance--"are lacking in direct, monopolistic
government services, hence the move towards privatization of public services, where the
principal benefits are achieved by competition"); Slyke, supra note 129, at 297 (discussing the
views of privatization advocates: "' [T]he greatest potential advantage of a contract-based system
rests in the ability to promote competition among private agencies."' (quoting Mark Schlesinger
et al., Competitive Bidding and States' Purchase of Services: The Case of Mental Health Care in
Massachusetts,5 J. OF POL'Y ANALYSIS AND MGMT. 245)).
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increasing the quality of public services.' 34 Further, the political
advantages of privatization include reducing government135size and freeing
up resources which are better utilized for other purposes.
Consistent with the general trend towards privatization of public
services, citizens in many areas of the country rely-sometimes
exclusively-on private companies for the provision of emergency medical
services.' 36 As a result, the private sector of emergency medical service is

134

See Hansen, supra note 129, at 2465 ("Some elected officials believe that private-sector

provision of services always results in financial savings and better quality of service over public
provision."); Savas, supra note 129, at 90 (stating that the "notion that for-profit private firms
could undersell and outperform nonprofit government agencies .... [n]ow... is accepted as the
rule rather than the exception"). A study of 347 local health departments revealed that 50% of
directors "claimed that privatization helped their department's performance of core functions."
Christopher Keane et al., The Perceived Impact of Privatization on Local Health Departments,
92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1178, 1178 (2002). A previous study showed that "73% of all [local
health departments] have privatized at least [one] service." Id.; see also Martz, supra note 130
(discussing Fulton, Georgia's move towards privatizing an under performing children's shelter);
Reagin, supra note 130 (detailing Indianapolis's privatization of city waterworks and the
resulting "improved water quality").
135 See Hansen, supra note 129, at 2465 (stating that "[p]oliticians may want to appear to
decrease the size of government by reducing the number of directly employed government
workers"); Slyke, supra note 129, at 307 ("Increased demands for smaller and more efficient
government have led many elected officials and agency executives to seek privatization as a
vehicle-some suggest panacea-for controlling costs.").
136 Residents in the rural areas outside of Bloomington, Illinois depend on LifeLine Mobile
Medics to provide the area with ambulance service and paramedics. This is important in rural
areas where it can take over thirty minutes to arrive at a hospital. Analysis of County Impact
Acute in Ambulance Study, PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington, IL), May 5, 2002, at C2. Rural/Metro
Corporation, "the nation's leading provider of private ambulance and firefighting services"
provides such services to about 400 communities nationwide. Rural/Metro Awarded Exclusive
Ambulance ContractRenewal for Fort Worth and Surrounding Communities, BUS. WIRE, April
24, 2003. In Fort Worth Texas and twelve surrounding communities, 850,000 rely exclusively on
Rural/Metro Corporation for emergency medical services. Id. In New York City, private entities
account for almost 50% of"911" ambulance service. Edward M. Dolan, Fix the Fire Department
So It Can Do More, NEWSDAY, Dec. 12, 2002, at A46. "The private ambulance services of
Milwaukee County are a vital component of the emergency medical system." Emergency Care;
Private Ambulance Service Vital, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jul. 9, 2000, at 5J. In Kansas City,
almost one-third of the metropolitan area relies on private corporations for "primary ambulance
service." Kevin Hoffman, With End of Operations Contract, Ambulance Service Is at a
Crossroads,KAN. CITY STAR, July 1, 2003. In Massachusetts "[p]rivate ambulances now handle
62 percent of emergency calls and 90 percent of nonemergency medical transport calls." Sue
Reinhert, New Faceoff Over Emergency Medical Services, PATRIOT LEDGER, (Quincy, MA),
Feb. 12, 2003, at 16. Sixty-five thousand residents in the East St. Louis metropolitan area rely on
Simmons Ambulance, a private company, for emergency medical services. Deborah L. Shelton,
Hospital Says its Ambulance Service May Have To Be Cut; Move Could Affect Alortan,
Centreville and Cahokia, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 3, 2003, at B2. Additionally, large
corporations are increasingly contracting with private ambulance companies to provide services
for their employees. Richard Perez-Pena, Not Counting on 911, Companies Hire Private
Ambulances, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, at 13.
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growing rapidly. 137 A coordinate trend of the past decade is an increasing
number of lawsuits filed against ambulance companies. 138 The growing
industry is particularly vulnerable to the substantial costs associated with
defending against claims.13 9 This vulnerability threatens the survival of
these private companies, and in turn threatens the large numbers of citizens
who rely on them for the provision of emergency medical service.
The extension of sovereign or governmental immunity to private
entities providing public services will facilitate privatization and the
resulting innovation and efficiency. 140 The policy justifications supporting
sovereign immunity generally 141 apply equally to private entities in this
context. Protection of resources is an important goal of sovereign
immunity. 42 Because a large number of citizens throughout the country
rely on private providers for emergency medical services, protecting their
resources is a critical objective. The public cannot afford to lose these
services, which is a possibility if the entities providing them remain
exposed to unlimited liability.
Other policy justifications offered in support of sovereign immunity,
namely the need for order in the administration of government and the
137 According to a recent Department of Labor report, four out of ten emergency medical
technicians were employed by private ambulance companies. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK: EMERGENCY MEDICAL
TECHNICIANS AND PARAMEDICS 320 (2004-05). Furthermore, employment opportunities for
emergency medical technicians and paramedics are "expected to grow faster than the average for
all occupations through 2010," and "[m]ost opportunities for EMT's and paramedics are
expected to [be] found in private ambulance services." Id
138 See David Harrawood et al., Liability: Is EMS Putting You Out on a Limb?, 20 J.
EMERGENCY MED. SERVICES, 5 (1995), availableat http://www.naemd.org/articles/liabilityl.
htm; Wiggins, supra note 25 at 359 (noting that "claims against [emergency medical service]
providers continue to increase"); see also Tresa Baldas, Mean Streets: As Expectations Rise,
Paramedics See More Lawsuits, 26 NAT'L L.J. 4 (2003) ("Lawyers representing ambulance
companies say that over the last decade an increasing number of people have started suing their
clients."). Emergency medical technicians and their employers, private or public, can be held
liable for both malpractice and negligence. See Thomas A. Moore & Matthew Gaier, Liabilityfor
Negligence by Emergency Medical Technicians, N.Y.L.J. December 7, 1999, at 3.
1 Private entities realize that "'[j]ust one claim could wipe [them] out."' Baldas, supra
note 138, at A18 (quoting Tyron Picard, an executive vice president for Acadian Ambulance
which provides service to Louisiana and Mississippi). Another Acadian employee noted "'[y]ou
know your company can be devastated from one event... [i]t's always in the back of your mind,
but you can't think about it on a day-to-day basis."' Matthew Volz, Associated Press,
Malpractice Problems Extend to Emergency Medical Workers, Sept. 18, 2002. Additionally,
private entities may not be able to recover costs incurred from their insurance carriers. See
Shannon P. Duffy, Ambulance Co. 's Insurer Has Limited Duty, 224 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 93
(May 14, 2001).
140 See supra notes 131-136 and accompanying text.
141 See supra Part II.
142 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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public benefits flowing from the unhampered delivery of services by
public officials, can be offered to support the extension of immunity to
private emergency medical service providers. The current state of affairs
is unsettled, providing little guidance to emergency medical service
companies regarding avoidance of liability. 143 Individual technicians
employed by private entities may refrain from acting due to fear of
litigation.1 44 Excessive litigation can interfere with the orderly and
effective delivery of any service, including that provided by a private
entity. Immunity would provide private entities and their employees with
a sense of security, eliminating these problems and potentially translating
into higher quality service for the public.
Emergency medical service is an essential, public necessity. 45 State
legislatures should take one of the following steps to ensure that private
emergency medical service providers and their employees receive
immunity. 146 States can declare the provision of emergency medical
service a governmental function. This approach would work in states
where immunity hinges on whether a governmental function is at issue. In
states where governmental immunity depends on whether the service is
provided by a political subdivision or agent thereof, legislators should
declare all entities which provide emergency medical service as acting on
behalf of political subdivision, municipality or other relevant entity.
Finally, in states that do not recognize sovereign or governmental
immunity, the proper approach is specific legislation immunizing all
emergency medical service providers and their employees. Absent these
approaches, states should institute notice provisions and limits on the
amounts recoverable by claimants to ensure the survival of private entities
providing emergency medical service.

143 See supra Part II.
144 See Kari v. City of Maplewood, 582 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn. 1998) (holding that

paramedics were entitled to official immunity because the absence of immunity might produce "a

chilling effect on the discretion to be exercised" by such persons).

145 See City of Memphis v. Bettis, 512 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tenn.

1974) (holding that
"ambulance service is a necessary function of city government, imposed by the government's
basic mandate to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens"); Carrola v. Guillen, 935
S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. App. 1996) (stating that "emergency medical service is particularly
deserving of immunity"); Ayala v. City of Corpus Christi, 507 S.W.2d 324, 328 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974) (holding that emergency medical service is "a service kindred to the police or fire service.
This type of service is incident to the police power of the state: i.e. to protect the health, safety,
and general welfare of its citizens."); Edwards v. City of Portsmouth, 375 S.E.2d 747, 749-50

(Va. 1989) (holding the provision of ambulance services by a city is a governmental function).
146

The proposed immunity would extend only to acts amounting to ordinary negligence.

Private firms and/or their employees would remain liable for gross negligence and intentional
misconduct.
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CONCLUSION
Extension of sovereign immunity should be controlled by the nature
of the service provided rather than by the nature of the entity providing it.
The policy justifications supporting sovereign immunity generally support
this approach. Basing immunity on the nature of the service provided
would encourage privatization, as private entities would have a greater
incentive to enter government contracts. The extension of liability to
private entities would also encourage experimentation with different types
of programs, leading to the cost-effective provision of high quality public
services. The benefits of public-private partnerships are numerous, well
documented, and extend to both governments and their citizens.

